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Municipal Corporations - Municipality's Obligation To Pay Back
Salary To De Jure Officer After Payment To De Facto Officer
P, incumbent highway surveyor, was ousted from his office
after the election results were contested. The town council appointed P's opponent to the office and P commenced quo warranto
proceedings. The court held that P was entitled to the office. During this period the de facto officer, the officer appointed by the
town council, was paid the salary incident to the office of highway
surveyor. P, de jure officer, sued the municipality for the salary
incident to the office for the period in which he was not allowed
to hold office. Held, where the governmental body is responsible
for the situation created, where it has notice of the dispute, and
where the de jure officer has not acquiesced in his removal from
office, he is entitled to the salary of the office even though the
salary has been paid to a de facto officer. La Belle v. Hazard, 160
A.2d 723 (R.I. 1960).
The instant case was one of first impression in its jurisdiction
and since the facts were not in dispute, the court was faced with
choosing between two distinct views in the United States. The two
views are supported by various reasons, and both call upon the
broad terms of public policy for support. The majority view relies
heavily on the arguments that the de jure officer has a remedy
against the de facto officer for the salary he has been deprived of
during this period and that the municipality should not be required to pay twice for the rendition of only one service. The
jurisdictions which follow the minority view support their position
by arguing that the de jure officer does not have a complete and
adequate remedy against the de facto officer, and that the salary
is incident to the office and belongs to the person who holds legal
title to the office. The decision in the instant case has placed this
jurisdiction within the minority view.
The minority view is that a de jure officer has a right to
collect the salary incident to the office although the salary has
been paid in good faith to a de facto officer. Andrews v. City of
Portland, 79 Me. 484, 10 At. 458 (1887); State ex rel. Brumit v.
Grindstaff, 144 Tenn. 554, 234 S.W. 510 (1921); Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 1375 (1959); 37 AM. Jui. Municipal Corporations§ 259
(1941). The majority view holds that payment to the de facto officer is a good defense to an action brought by the de jure officer.
Coughlin v. McElroy, 74 Conn. 397, 50 At. 1025 (1902); State
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ex rel. Cox v. Hooper, 137 Ohio St. 222, 28 N.E.2d 598 (1940);
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1375 (1959); Annot., 55 A.L.R. 997 (1928);
37 Am. JuR. Municipal Corporations § 259 (1941).
The minority view or the "more reasonable rule", as labeled

by some writers, 4 Mc

QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §

12.182

(3rd ed. 1949), seems in some situations to be the more logical
rule. Once the governmental body is shown to have caused the
situation, or the governmental body has acquiesced in its existence,
and the de jure officer is shown to have clean hands it is easy for
the court to follow the "more reasonable rule." 4 Mc QUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.182 (3rd ed. 1949). The courts
which hold with the minority view state that the salary is incident
to the office and belongs to the person who holds legal title to the
office and it does not depend on the value of the services rendered.
State ex rel. Worrell v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44, 28 N.E. 88 (1891); 4
Mc QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §

12.175 (3rd ed. 1949);

Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1375 (1959).
The most often quoted authority for the minority view is the
dissent by Judge Cooley in the case of Board of Auditors of the
County of Wayne v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176 (1870). In this opinion,
at page 192, it is pointed out that the minority rule can be sustained
on the basis of public policy. "A wrong is done to society . . .
in every instance in which the usurpation of the public office takes
place; and the rules of law ought to be such as to give the greatest
possible discouragement to such a proceeding." It is also pointed
out in the opinion that the remedy of the de jure officer against
the de facto officer, which is the remedy advocated by the majority
view, may not be a complete and adequate remedy because the de
facto officer may not be financially responsible and that the correct
rule of damages is not altogether clear.
The majority view has been sustained for numerous reasons. Some courts state that it is against public policy for the
municipality to have to pay twice when it has received but one
service, and that efficiency in government requires that officers be
promptly paid for their work. Martin v. City of New York, 176
N.Y. 371, 68 N.E. 640 (1903); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1375 (1959).
In Bowling v. Franklin County, 152 Miss. 534, 120 So. 453 (1929),
the court stated that the office must be filled for the public good
to assure the smooth operation of the government. In 4 Mc QuILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.182 (3rd ed. 1949), the author
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points out that in jurisdictions following the majority view the de
jure officer is given a right to recover from the de facto officer.
This is one of the most common arguments advanced in support
of the majority view.
In West Virginia there seems to have been no decisions directly
in point on this question. In Bier v. Gorrell, 30 W. Va. 95, 3 S.E.
30 (1887), the court held that the de jure officer has a remedy
against the de facto officer to recover the salary paid to him after
a deduction of reasonable expenses in earning the salary. This
decision has no direct bearing on the situation presented in the
instant case but it does sustain one of the propositions set forth
by the courts as a reason for following the majority view.
In Webb v. Williamson, 107 W. Va. 375, 148 S.E. 324 (1939),
the court was presented with a similiar situation but the plaintiff, who
was suing for the back salary, had not proven that he was the de
jure office. The court held that plaintiff must prove first, in a separate
suit, that he is the de jure officer before they will allow him to
bring a suit for the alleged back salary due. The court however
went on to state that even if plaintiff was the de jure officer that payment by the municipality to the de facto officer would be a complete
defense to plaintiff's action even though the municipality may have
known, at the time the salary was paid, that title to the office was in
question. This is an expression of approval of the majority view but
it is only dictum in this case; therefore, it seems that this proposition
is still an open question in West Virginia.
Some states have solved this question by accepting the minority
view by statute. In New Jersey if an officer is illegally dismissed
from office he may, on judicial determination that the dismissal
was illegal, recover his salary for the period of illegal dismissal.
N.J. REv. STAT. § 40:46-34 (1937). In Iowa about the same situation has been created. See Hild v. Polk County, 242 Iowa 1354,
49 N.W.2d 206 (1951), which interprets Iowa STAT. ANN. tit. 4,
§ 66.9 (1949). In Florida the minority view has been accepted as
to suspended officers. Fla. CONST. art. 4, § 15. Although these
states have accepted the minority view by statute, it is virtually
impossible to predict how the courts will handle this question in the
future since the latest decisions in jurisdictions without a statute
on the question are not in harmony. 4 Mc QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 12.182 (3rd ed. 1949).
William Warren Upton
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